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"ETHICAL FICTIONS AS ETHICAL
FOUNDATIONS": JUSTIFYING
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
BY NANCY LEE FIRAK*
The ethics of professionals are different from the ethics of the community at large
Conduct which would be unethical by community standards is ethical within the
context of a profession. This article examines the ways in which a different professional
ethic can be justified and, by reference to a contemporary play, considers the
consequences of such justifications.
I. JUSTIFYING PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
There is little debate that professional ethics differ from community
ethics' and that some conduct, which would be unethical by community
© Copyright, 1986, Nancy Lee Firak.
* Assistant Professor, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.
By "ethics" I shall mean "a group of moral principles or a set of values" relating to right
and wrong, duty and obligation. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
(1964).
For purposes of this paper, "ethics" and "morals" shall be considered synonymous though
the latter is often taken to have a more limited application to rules of behaviour. See eg., L. Churchill, "
"The Professionalization of Ethics" (1977) 60 Soundings 40 at 41.
When I refer to "community" ethics or "ordinary" ethics I mean those general ethical principles
of right and wrong, duty and obligation believed by society to be valid and to promote approved
goals. More specifically, the terms "community" and "ordinary" ethics are intended to be distinguished
from "professional ethics."
When distinguishing between professional ethics and ordinary or community ethics, in addition
to those specific characteristics of professional ethics discussed in the text, I appeal to the reader's
common-sense understanding of the differences that exist. I acknowledge, however, that one might
mean several things by the term "professional ethics." M. Martin in "Professional and Ordinary
Morality: A Reply to Freedman" (1981) 91 Ethics 631 at 631 cites the following possible definitions:
(1) Professional morality consists of the standards endorsed by professionals or professional
societies. Ordinary morality is the set of standards people endorse in their nonprofessional,
private lives. (2) Professional morality is the set of binding moral obligations to which
professionals ought to be committed because of their special skills, functions, working milieu,
etc. Ordinary morality is the set of valid moral considerations and morally correct judgments
considered in abstraction from the special context of the professions and the specific moral
obligations of professions. (3) Ordinary morality in some sense "emanates from" or has
its origin (or justification?) in basic features of the human condition, whereas professional
morality derives from the special roles of professionals. (4) Professional morality is a set
of valid moral principles which sometimes requires acts that are immoral for anyone except
persons having professional status. Ordinary morality is the set of considerations which would
make the acts immoral in the case of nonprofessional agents.
If forced to choose, I would say number four most closely articulates what I mean by the
term "professional ethics."
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standards, is ethical within the context of a profession.2 For example,
both the medical and the legal professions require the keeping of patient-
client confidences even under circumstances when the layperson would
reveal them.3 Lying, while condemned by community ethical norms, is
expected, even required, by social scientists, physicians, and lawyers.4
2 See eg., T. Shaffer, "The Legal Ethic of the Two Kingdoms" (1983) 17 Val. U.L. Rev.
3 at 3-5, 8, 15 (lawyers' and politicians' ethics differ from individual ethics); G. Postema, "Moral
Responsibility in Professional Ethics" (1980) 55 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 63 (legal ethics differ from ordinary
ethics); W. Robison, "Professional Responsibility" in W. Robison, M. Pritchard & J. Ellin, eds.,
Profits and Professions; Essays in Business and Professional Ethics (Clifton, NJ.: Humana Press, 1983)
3 (generally, professional ethics differ from ordinary ethics); T. Machan, "Ethics and the Regulation
of Professional Ethics" (1983) 13 Philosophia 337 at 340-42 (teachers and doctors have special
ethical obligations); B. Williams, "Professional Morality and Its Dispositions" in D. Luban, ed.,
The Good Lawyer (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Allenheld, 1983) 259 at 259 (lawyers' and physicians'
morality differs from ordinary morality); A. Donagan, "Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary
System" in ibid at 123 (lawyers' and professional soldiers' morality differs from ordinary morality);
T. Franck & E. Weisband, "Congress and the Concept of Ethical Autonomy" in D. Jones, ed.,
Private and Public Ethics Tensions Between Conscience and Institutional Responsibility (New York:
E. Mellen Press, 1978) 180 (politicians' ethics differ from ordinary ethics); B. Freedman, "A Meta-
Ethics for Professional Morality" (1978) 89 Ethics I (medical ethics differ from ordinary ethics).
I will assume for the purposes of this paper that one cannot discuss professional ethics in
a meaningful way unless one discusses professional morality as it is manifested in conduct. This
is, however, debatable.
3 Benjamin Freedman discusses in depth the ethical dimensions of the confidentiality require-
ments of the medical profession, identifying confidentiality as a "clearly ... professional issue."
See Freedman, supra, note 2 at 1. His article sparked debate over several years: M. Martin, "Rights
and the Meta-Ethics of Professional Morality" (1981) 91 Ethics 619; B. Freedman, "What Really
Makes Professional Morality Different: Response to Martin" (1981) 91 Ethics 626; Martin, supra,
note 1; W. Starr, "Ethical Theory, Confidentiality and Professional Ethics" (1984) 15 Metaphilosophy
129.
In the field of legal ethics, confidentiality is likewise a controversial issue, particularly when
a guilty criminal defendant is involved. See eg., M. Freedman, "Professional Responsibility of the
Criminal Defense Lawyer The Three Hardest Questions" (1966) 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469; M. Frankel,
"The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View" (1975) 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031; M. Freedman, "Judge
Frankel's Search for Truth" (1975) 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1060; H. Uviller, "The Advocate, the Truth
and Judicial Hackels: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea" (1975) 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1067; W. Pizii,
"Judge Frankel and the Adversary System" (1981) 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 357.
The dimensions of confidentiality requirements in the journalism profession are illuminated
in J. Hulteng, Playing It Straight; A Practical Discussion of the Ethical Principles of the American
Society of Newspaper Editors (Easton, Pa.: American Society of Newspaper Editors, 198 1) (Distributed
by the Globe Pequot Press). Journalistic ethics are criticized in S. Bok, Lying, Moral Choice in
Public and Private Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1978) at 119-22.
Confidentiality in the medical professions is examined in N. Bowie, "'Role' as a Moral Conception
Health Care" (1982) 7 J. Med. Phil. 57; R. Veatch, "Professional Medical Ethics: The Grounding
of Its Principles" (1979) 4 J. Med. Phil. 1; see also D. Emmet, Rules, Roles and Relations (London:
Macmillan, 1966) at 159 (medical profession), 160 (priesthood).
4 Social scientists may intentionally deceive their human subjects in the course of experi-
mentation. Physicians or research scientists may deceive their subjects about the nature of their
condition or the therapeutic value of treatment. Bok, ibid at 220-41, 182-202; Churchill, supra,
note 1. The social consequences of such lies are investigated in Bok at 47-72.
Lying as an ethical norm in the legal profession is examined in R. Burke, "'Truth in Lawyering':
An Essay on Lying and Deceit in the Practice of Law" (1984) 38 Ark. L. Rev. 1; see generally,
R. Fisher & W. Ury, Getting to Yes (New York: Penguin Books, 1983) at 137-48.
Lying by businessmen in the course of business transactions (justified on the grounds of "economic
necessity") is examined in T. Carson & R. Wokutch, "The Moral Status of Bluffing and Deception
in Business" in Robison, Pritchard & Ellin, eds., supra, note 2 at 141; A. Carr, "Is Business Bluffing
Ethical?" (1968) 46 Harv. Bus. Rev. 143.
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A physician, for example, may lie to a patient about the seriousness of
his or her illness if, within the physician's judgment, the overall health
of the patient would be threatened by honest disclosure. The physician's
unethical conduct, lying, pursues the community-approved ideal of
preservation of the patient's health.5 A lawyer negotiating for a client
may 'exaggerate' and 'misrepresent' the settlement terms to secure the
most advantageous outcome without respect to what is fair or reasonable.6
Such behaviour pursues the socially approved ideal of the legal autonomy
of clients.
Justification7 of the differences between professional and ordinary
ethics proceeds on two levels:8 the professional ideal and the professional
role. These levels of justification are related and often merged in the
course of analysis of professional ethics, but are really two distinct
arguments.
Justification of a different professional ethic at the level of the
professional ideal is founded on the belief that the professions represent
important ethical ideals which are considered by the community "to serve
a vital moral function in society." 9 The ethical ideals of each professional
5 See generally A. Goldman, The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics (Totowa, NJ.:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1980) at 173-95. Goldman argues for the patient's right to know at 195-
229. See also D. Ost, "The 'Right' Not to Know" (1984) 9 J. Med. Phil. 301; W. Tweel, "Five
Ethical Doctrines for Medical Education" (1982) 8 J. Med. Ethics 37; D. Hashimoto, "A Structural
Analysis of the Physician-Patient Relationship in No-Code Decisionmaking" (1983) 93 Yale L.
362.
6 Carson & Wokutch, supra, note 4 at 141. See also Carr, supra, note 4. T. Blodgett, "Showdown
on 'Business Bluffing"' (1968) 46 Harv. Bus. Rev. 162. On the legal ethics of negotiation, see
generally R. Haydock, Negotiation Practice (New York: Wiley, 1984) at 195-216; A. Ruben, "A
Causerie on Lawyer's Ethics in Negotiations" (1975) 35 La. L. Rev. 577; J. White, "Machiavelli
and the Bar Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation" [1980] Am. Bar Found. Res. . 926;
T. Guernsey, "Truthfulness in Negotiation" (1982) 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 99; Fisher & Ury, supra,
note 4.
7 By "justified," I mean to show to be right, just, or appropriate by giving reasons.
8 Some commentators on professional ethics conclude there can be nojustification for a different
professional ethic and call for the unification of ordinary and professional ethics. See A. Smith,
"The Ethics of Society Rather than Medical Ethics" (1982) 8 . Med. Ethics 120; C. Selinger,
"There Are No Such Things as Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer!" in D. Weckstein,
ed., Education in the Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer (Charlottesville: University of Virginia,
1970) at 271; J. Dubik, "Social Expectations, Moral Obligations and Command Responsibility"
(1984) 2 Int'l. J. App. Phil. 49 (military ethics are the same as ordinary ethics); J. Ellin, "Business
Ethics" in Robison, Pritchard & Ellin, eds., supra, note 2 at 77 (urging that business ethics should
no longer be distinguished from community ethics).
9 Goldman, supra, note 5 at 7. On community approval of professions and institutions, see
Williams, supra, note 2 at 260.
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institution vary.10 The medical profession, for example, represents the
ideal of physical and mental health. The legal profession professes to
be the guardian of justice and the rule of law." The clerical profession
pursues attainment of spiritual tranquillity.
Common to all professions is the elevation of certain norms or values
above their usual moral importance.' 2
The professional must elevate certain values or goals, those central in his profession,
such as health, or legal autonomy of clients, or profits, to the status of overriding
considerations in situations in which they might not appear overriding from the
viewpoint of normal moral perception. In doing so he will elevate certain interests
to those to whom he is professionally obligated, e.g., legal clients, political
constituency, patients, or stockholders, over other interests or those of other
individuals, in apparent violation of rights expressive of these other interests.'
3
Although such values are among those considered to be ethically
significant by the community, the professional
places professional values at a higher position in the ethical hierarchy.... [T]his
leads professionals to decisions in resolving value conflicts which conflict with
the decision which could be recommended by ordinary morality (given its different
hierarchy of values)., 4
1o The ethical ideals of the different professions may be in conflict. Thus, in the example
in the opening paragraph, the medical ethical ideal of giving help, or at least doing no harm,
allows the physician to lie to a patient about the seriousness of her or his physical condition. (For
a discussion of this ethic, see Bok, supra, note 3 at 220-49). On the other hand, ideals of the
legal profession, which elevate the autonomy and integrity of the individual's 'right to know', would
require full disclosure to the patients so they could make their own decisions. See eg., V. Unan,
"The Right to Choose an Unproven Method of Treatment" (1979) 13 Loyola (L.A.) L. Rev. 227;
Cf supra, note 5.
A patient's informed consent has been the subject of law suits. See eg. R. Belier, "From Informed
Consent to a Duty to Convince: Truman v. Thomas" (1981) 18 Hous. L. Rev. 917; Wilson v.
Scott (1967), 412 S.W. 2d 299 (Texas); Cobbs v. Grant (1972), 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P. 2d 1.
The informed consent question is at issue in the field of research science; see K. Woody,
"Legal and Ethical Concepts Involved in Informed Consent to Human Research" (1981) 18 Cal.
W.L. Rev. 50; McClellan, "Informed Consent to Medical Therapy and Experimentation, the Case
for Invoking Punitive Damages to Deter Impingement of Individual Autonomy" (1982) 13 J. Leg.
Med. 81; M. Silva, "Informed Consent on Human Experimentation: The Scientist's Responsibility
- The Subject's Right" (1980) 16:12 Trial 37.
11 American Bar Association, Model Code of Professional Responsibility Preamble (1982). The
Model Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the ABA in 1969 and was adopted
in some form by virtually all the states. While there may be a number of other, additional sources
for a lawyer's professional responsibilities, such as state or federal statute or court rule, the Model
Code sets forth the ethical standards of the profession. Violation of the standards of the Model
Code can lead to reprimand, suspension, or disbarment.
Dissatisfaction with the Model Code led the ABA to appoint the Kutak Commission to update
and clarify the perceived inadequacies and ambiguities of the Model Code. The final product of
the Commission, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct was adopted by the ABA in 1983. Since
then eleven states had adopted the Model Rules in place of the Model Code, see Nix v. Whiteside
(1986), 106 S. CL 988 at 995, n.4.
12 Goldman, supra, note 5 at 2.
13 Ibid at 3-4.
14 Freedman, supra, note 2 at 10.
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The more highly elevated particular professional norms or values are
within a profession, the greater the difference between ordinary and
professional ethics is likely to be.
Under this argument of justification, professional ethics are more
stringent than ordinary ethics.' 5 The resolution of ethical problems is
more complicated for the professional than for the layperson.16 The
professional must consider not only the elevated values of the profession
but also the degree to which the institutional ideals of the profession
itself are advanced. 7
If the professional finds that professional conduct not only violates
community ethics but also fails to advance the professional ethical ideal,
he or she is confronted with the obligation to refuse to abide by the
professional ethic. Hence, the professional should violate the professional
code of conduct, and instead should conform to the community ethic.18
A critical inquiry by the community or by professionals (as individuals
or as institutions) is necessary to determine whether the higher professional
ideal has value to the community, 9 and whether or not the different
15 Ibid at 4.
Another way of thinking about this:
Law professors and lawyers erroneously believe that their legal training and their intellectual
tools will enable them "to strip a problem, any problem, down to its essentials." The
socialization process begun in law school creates and provides the lawyer with a new model
of the world ... which excludes much from its vision. As Professor Scheingold has noted:
"When we accuse someone of being legalistic, we suggest an excessive zeal for purely formal
details which becloud rather than clarify the real issue."
J. Elkins, "The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask" (1978) 64 Va. L. Rev. 736
at 741.
The perception that the ethics of the lawyer are less rather than more complex than those
of the layperson is addressed at pages 9 through 12, infra
16 On a psychiatrist's professional ethical dilemma about whether to maintain the confidentiality
of a patient who intends to commit suicide, one author has said:
What is essential to understand here is that the weights are different for an ordinary citizen
as opposed to the professional. For the ordinary citizen, there is relatively little doubt which
course of action to take. For the professional, it is not clear what should be done.... The
burden of justification is on the professional who wishes to breach confidentiality. This is
not so with ordinary persons. The bond of confidentiality between two persons in a
nonprofessional capacity is simply not that strong.
Starr, supra, note 3 at 131.
17 Freedman, supra, note 2 at 10.
18 This will be called, in Parts II and III of this paper, a professional foul.
19 Many commentators criticize the notion that professional ethics serve community ideals
and point to the substantial connection between the professions' interest in self-preservation and
their adherence to distinct ethical codes. See ag., E. Pellegrino, "Toward a Reconstruction of Medical
Morality: The Primacy of the Act of Profession and the Fact of Illness" (1979) 4 J. Med. Phil.
32; Emmet, supra, note 3; L. Newton, "Professionalization: The Intractable Plurality of Values"
in Robison, Pritchard & Ellin, eds.,supra, note 2 at 23-26; Veatch, supra, note 3; J. Kultgen, "Evaluating
Codes of Professional Ethics" in Robison, Pritchard & Ellin, eds., supra, note 2 at 225; J. Elkins,
"'All My Friends Are Becoming Strangers': The Psychological Perspective in Legal Education"
(1981) 84 W. Va. L. Rev. 161 at 212 ("The radical critique of legal education [is that] [lI]aw
schools exist to produce professionals who utilize their legal expertise to support the dominant
ruling class in society."); M. Diamond, "Law, the Problems of Poverty and the 'Myth of Rights'
[1980] B.Y.U.L. Rev. 785 (in which the author finds no moral consensus in the legal profession).
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professional ethic tends to achieve the higher ideal. For example, within
the legal profession, "all of the arguments that support the... amorality
of the lawyer on institutional grounds can succeed only if the enormous
degree of trust and confidence in the institutions themselves is itself
justified." 20
Individual professionals, however, rarely make such inquiries and
rarely deviate from the conduct their professions consider to be required,
even when such conduct is in conflict with community ethics.2' Con-
temporary criticism of the professions charges that this is so not because
individual professionals are making poorly reasoned ethical choices, but
because there are no choices being made; that there is no serious inquiry
into the value of the professions' ethical ideals at any level.22 Professional
education, for example, is criticised for its failure to provide meaningful
The purpose of the legal profession, as manifested by its Code of Professional Responsibility
has been suggested to be merely to preserve the adversary system (as distinguished from achieving
the purposes of that system) or to insulate the profession from regulation or to serve as a guide
to good public relations. See eg., R. Abel, "Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?" (1981)
59 Tex. L. Rev. 639; P. Shuchman, "Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as
a Group Moral Code" (1968) 37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 244; J. Lieberman, Crisis at the Bar Lawyers'
Unethical Ethics and What to Do About It (1978); J. Bennett, Outlaws in Swivel Chairs (New York:
Comet Press Books, 1958); F. Cady, "Old Wine in New Bottles - Teaching Professional
Responsibility in New Settings" in P. Keenan, ed., Teaching Professional Responsibility, Materials
and Proceedings from the National Conference (Detroit: University of Detroit School of Law, 1979)
at 223.
20 R. Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues" (1975) 5 Hum. Rts. I
at 12-13. One commentator has suggested that the "modem [legal] system has created a gap
between legal norms and actual values or interests of individuals in the society." W. Rich, "The
Role of Lawyers: Beyond Advocacy" [1980] B.Y.U.L. Rev. 767 at 783. See also, D. Thomasma,
"The Possibility of a Normative Medical Ethics" (1980) 5 J. Med. Phil. 249 (seven inconsistent
answers suggested); Newton, supra, note 19 at 23 (professions ethically and legally disorganized).
21 1 mean this in a general way. Individual professionals are occasionally sanctioned for failing
to abide by professional standards of conduct. (Lawyers, for instance, are disciplined for failure
to abide by one or another of the disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.)
But on such occasions, the professional has perhaps too zealously observed professional norms or
taken to an extreme the autonomy of professional ethics. I will argue later that one who seriously
rejects professional norms of conduct will be removed from the profession altogether. See page
28-29, infra.
22 Franck & Weisband, supra, note 2 at 180. They continue, "The result, in decision-making
circumstances, has been described by the psychologist Irving Janus as 'group think'."
The central problem in professional ethics as actually practiced is not that professionals
often fail to live up to their unique official codes and professional principles; nor that they
lack the will to enforce them. It is rather that they often assume without question that
they ought to live up to them.
Goldman, supra, note 5 at 33.
On the failure of professionals generally to inquire into the coherence of professional conduct
and professional ideals see A. Donagan, "Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System" in
Luban, ed., supra, note 2 at 123 (lawyers); Franck & Weisband, supra, note 2 (members of congress);
Elkins, supra, note 15 at 735; Newton, supra, note 19 at 27-29 (lawyers, physicians, physicists).
For the proposition that "[f]ormal education in law does not prepare lawyers for the moral
perils of the profession," see A. Eshete, "Does a Lawyer's Character Matter?" in Lubin, ed., supra,
note 2 at 271.
[VOL. 24 NO, I
Justifying Professional Ethics
ethical education 3 and for its inability to equip professionals with the
intellectual and humanitarian skills to make ethical decisions. 24
At the same time, it is recognized that the process of profession-
alization (including professional education and socialization) involves the
adoption of a professional role.25 When one adopts a role2 6 "one is not
acting strictly as an individual. Since adopting a role means that one
23 The inadequacy of ethical training in law schools has been widely criticized. Consider
R. Condlin, "The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education" in Luban, ed., supra, note 3 at 217;
A. Watson, "The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome: An Education Deficiency Disease" (1974) 26 J.
Leg. Ed. 441; J. Elkins, "Moral Discourse and Legalism in Legal Education" (1982) 32 J. Leg.
Ed. 11; M. Kelly, Legal Ethics and Legal Education (Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hastings Centre,
Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, 1980); Shuchman, supra, note 19 at 244;
D. Weckstein, "Watergate and the Law Schools" (1975) 12 San Diego L. Rev. 261.
The quality and content of ethical education in medical schools is also criticized. Churchill,
supra, note 1 at 43; Tweel, supra, note 5; Thomasma, supra, note 20; K. Howe, M. Holmes &
A. Elstein, "Teaching Clincial Decision Making" (1984) 9 J. Med. Phil. 215; R. Schwartz & J. Gibson,
"Defining the Role of the Physician: Medical Education, Tradition and the Legal Process" (1981)
18 Hous. L. Rev. 779.
The ethical education of teachers is criticized in K. Varga, "Ethical Competence in Professional
Ethics" [1981] Phil. Stud. Ed. 74.
24 A substantial body of commentary on the teaching of legal ethics in law schools considers
not only how legal ethics should be taught, see eg. M. Kelly, ibid at 5-21; A. Kronman "Forward:
Legal Scholarship and Moral Education" (1981) 90 Yale L. J. 955; N. Redlich, "The Moral Value
of Clinical Legal Education: A Reply to Professor Condlin" in Luban, ed., supra, note 3 at 350,
but also who should teach it, see eg. R. Pipkin, "Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility:
A Curricular Paradox" [1979] Am. B.F.J. 247; A. Watson, "Psychological Aspects of Teaching
Professional Responsibility" in Keenan, ed., supra, note 19 at 69; C. Joiner, "Teaching Professional
Responsibility" (1978) 64 A.B.A. J. 551, and whether students can learn it, see eg., D. Weckstein,
"Watergate and the Law Schools" (1975) 12 San Diego L. Rev. 261; Elkins, bid; Watson, ibid;
J. Taylor, "Law School Stress and the 'Deformation Professionelle' (1976) 27 J. Leg. Ed. 251.
Some have raised the question whether legal ethics should be taught; that is, whether the
ethics of the profession are worth transmitting. Wassertrom, for example, raises the question of
whether the adversary system is worth its human costs. Wasserstrom, supra, note 20. Others urge
careful assessment of the relative morality of the lawyer against the morality of the individual,
see eg., G. Postema, "Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics" (1980) 55 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 63;
D. Luban, "Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal Ethics" (1981)
40 Md. L. Rev. 451; J. Elkins, "Moral Discourse and Legalism in Legal Education" (1982) 32
J. Leg. Ed. 11.
25 See, Editorial, "Two Concepts of Medical Ethics" (1985) 11 J. Med. Ethics 3; G. Agich,
"Roles and Responsibilities: Theoretical Issues in the Definition of Consultation Liaison Psychiatry"
(1985) 10 J. Med. Phil. 105; generally, J. Robinson, "Are We Teaching Students that Patients
Don't Matter?" (1985) 11 J. Med. Ethics 19.
26 "Role consists of the activity the incumbent would engage in were he to act solely in terms
of the normative demands upon someone in his position." E. Goffman, Encounters (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1961) at 85.
The term has also been defined in this way:
The concept of role is thus one which enters into the sociologist's account of social interaction.
It is needed in describing the repeatable patterns of social relations which are not mere
physical facts and which are structured partly by the rules of acceptable behaviour in the
society in question.
Emett, supra, note 3 at 15. Similarly: "A role.., is a cluster of rights and duties with some sort
of social function." R. Downie, Roles and Values, An Introduction to Social Ethics (London: Methuen,
1971) at 128.
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adopts a certain set of rules and expectations, one is then bonded to
those who operate within the same rule-governed framework." 27 Pro-
fessionals are apparently no more likely to attempt to act outside their
roles than others. "Societies, groups and organizations tend to systematize
the process of making value judgments; indeed they systematize the very
process by which they perceive reality. Few individuals deliberately choose
to set themselves against this process." 28 In short, having accepted the
professional role requires the individual to accept the professional ethic.29
In a complex society, an individual plays a number of roles; each
may require a different standard of conduct and contemplate a different
ethical ideal. Moreover, because of the complexity of society and of the
pervasive character of the professions within it, no individual professional
can possibly fulfill the ideals of the entire institution. The individual
professional is but one actor in a larger professional and social system
in which there are many necessarily diverse roles, all of which no one
individual can play. For example, no single lawyer can accomplish 'justice'
or himself protect the rule of law. However, one lawyer performing the
role of defence attorney can, with others performing such roles as
prosecuting attorney and trial judge, proceed toward fulfilment of the
institutional ideal.30
The second level of justification of the differences in professional
and ordinary ethics is founded upon these premises. It proceeds at the
27 Bowie, supra, note 3 at 58-59.
28 Franck & Weisband, supra, note 2.
29 Summarizing the position of R. Niebuhr in Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932), Little
says,
... [T]he collective ego, whether one's country, corporation or occupational team, is more
constraining, more inescapable, in determining one's action in the public world than the
individual ego is .... [I]t is emphatically not possible for people acting in roles that are
representative of group interests to avoid by very far protecting and favouring their group's
special interest, or going to extreme lengths, if necessary, to satisfy that interest .... It is
rather like Kant's notion of a "pragmatic necessity": If one chooses to act in a collective
context, then one must (of necessity) act in reference to group self interest.
D. Little, "Duties of Station vs. Duties of Conscience: Are There Two Moralities?" in Jones, ed.,
supra, note 2 at 127.
30 Some commentators would go even further.
A division of moral labour both at the level of practice and at the level of theories about
what the practice ought to be will have a better chance ... of leading to the improvement
of the ways we seek to develop morality than will any search for the one true unified
moral field theory of everything anyone might do.... I worry... that if everyone in every
role is obligated to take all moral considerations into account as completely as all others,
there will be more of a tendency than otherwise for no one to take any moral considerations
into account, and for responsibility to be even easier to evade than if different roles have
more limited and specifiable obligations and expectations.
V. Held, "The Division of Moral Labor and the Role of the Lawyer" in Luban, ed., supra, note
2, 60 at 64; S. Wolf, "Ethics, Legal Ethics and the Ethics of Law" in ibid at 38.
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level of the professional role rather than at the level of the professional
ideal.
This reasoning places weight upon the role that the person occupies and locates
concerns about how one ought to behave within a context of what is required,
expected, or otherwise appropriate of persons occupying that role. Such reasoning
is often used to deflect or defuse potential moral criticism by explaining that the
role constitutes a sufficient reason for doing or not doing something that would
otherwise be... morally wrong to do or not to do.31
For example, in the legal profession, the role of the advocate within
the adversary system would be justified in this way:
It is good ... that the lawyer's behaviour and concomitant point of view are
role-differentiated because the lawyer qua lawyer participates in a complex
institution which functions well only if the individuals adhere to their institutional
roles.... The adversary system ... is simply a better method than any other
that has been established by which to determine the legally relevant facts in any
given case. It certainly is a better method than the exercise of private judgment
by any particular individual. And the adversary system works only if each party
to the controversy has a lawyer, a person whose institutional role it is to argue,
plead and present the merits of his or her case and the demerits of the opponent's.
Thus if the adversary system is to work, it is necessary that there be lawyers
who will play their appropriate, professional institutional role. ... 32
Justification of differences between professional ethics and ordinary
ethics which proceeds at the level of the professional role has a very
different focus than justification which proceeds at the level of the
professional ideal. Although institutional ideals may inform the inquiry,
the role itself, not the ideal behind the role, is the focus of the ethical
inquiry.33 Professional conduct, which at the ideal level is justifiable only
31 R. Wasserstrom, "Roles and Morality" in ibia at 25-26.
32 Wasserstrom, supra, note 20 at 9-10.
33 An example of how the differing focus is manifested in legal education is suggested by
J. Elkins in an article in which he challenges what he calls the "psychological perspective" in
legal education. He says specifically of Professor Andrew Watson:
Most troubling is Watson's use of the psychoanalytic perspective to "fit" law students to
the professional role. The implicit assumption is that the professional role is an appropriate
one.... Watson does not... determine whether the professional role generally serves socially
desired ends.... There is real fear, which Watson does very little to dispel, that the underlying
reason for "handling" psychological factors is to make it easier to adapt to contemporary
role demands and to alleviate the suffering which comes from realizing that, as professionals,
we do too little to secure social justice and a more humane world.
Elkins, supra, note 19 at 183-84.
See also E. BenGershom, "Ethical Aspects of Clinical Chemistry" (1983) 9 J. Med. Ethics
207 in which the author urges clarification of the ethical obligations of the laboratory scientist
whose isolation from the patient and whose reliance upon the presumed ethical soundness of the
physician's determination encourages the elimination of all ethical inquiry. See also R. Schwartz,
"Institutional Review of Medical Research" (1983) 4 J. Leg. Med. 143.
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if demonstrably in pursuit of a higher ethical ideal, has itself become
the ethical standard or ideal.34
Roles are defined by rules of behaviour. As a result, role-justified
professional ethics are necessarily discussed within the context of the
individual professional's conformity to certain rules or codes of conduct.35
Since the rules of the profession define the parameters of the professional
role, role-justified professional ethics focus inquiry on the content and
interpretation of codes of conduct.
A professional code [of ethical conduct] can... be justified on functional grounds,
as promoting the kind of relationship within which a job is most likely to be
done effectively. But its importance is not only functional; the behaviour becomes
valued on its own account as a matter of professional integrity, and adds to the
respect with which a professional person is regarded in the community. 36
In return for conforming conduct, a professional code insulates the
individual in the professional role from responsibility for his or her conduct.
It creates a framework within which the professional can act out that
role without ethical accountability. 37 Thus, professional roles create
"special duties, . . . define responsibility and allocate power" while
separating, for purposes of ethical accountability, the individual from
the professional role.3 8 In this sense, "[w]hen one acts or makes decisions
in a professional role, one acts within a certain fixed framework which
is defined by the constitutive rules of the organization.... [O]ne often
has to take into account commitments and earlier decisions made by
others."39 Thus, for example, it has been argued that professional engineers
who collectively create a product dangerous to the public may not be
considered morally responsible as individuals for the consequences, though
the collective entity (the organization in which they work) may be held
34 "Professional ethics, then, is grounded in nothing beyond a professional group definition
of its own character and tradition. Certainly physicians, as citizens, have more universal sources
of obligation; but, as professionals, the source of norms is the profession itself." Veatch, supra,
note 3 at 11.
35 Emmet, supra, note 3 at 154. "What is ethical within a profession frequently is stipulated
by ethical codes ..." Varga, supra, note 23. See also, Pellegrino, supra, note 19 at 33.
36 Emmet, supra, note 3 at 162 (emphasis added).
37 The phenomena by which a professional code of ethics is reduced to a manual on etiquette
is discussed in Part II, infra.
38 J. Noonan Jr., Persons and Masks of the Law (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976)
at 14-15. He continues, "That officeholders and office are distinct makes possible the resolution
of conflict, survival after failure, correction after corruption. To introduce the person as an element
in law of this kind seems subversive of the system."
39 A. Flores & D. Johnson, "Collective Responsibility and Professional Roles" (1983) 93 Ethics
537 at 541.
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accountable.40 The lack of personal accountability for unethical conduct
under the protective cloak of a professional ethic is widely criticised.41
At this level of justification the professional's ethical universe is
simplified:42
at best the lawyer's world is a simplified moral world; often it is an amoral one;
and more than occasionally, perhaps, an overtly immoral one.... [I]t is the nature
of role-differentiated behaviour that often makes it both appropriate and desirable
for the person in a particular role to put to one side considerations of various
sorts - and especially various moral considerations - that would otherwise be
relevant if not decisive .... [T]o be a professional is to be enmeshed in role-
differentiated behaviour.... One's role as a doctor, psychiatrist, or lawyer, alters
one's moral universe.4
3
At this level of justification, professional ethics are viewed as a
discrete system operating largely - though not entirely - separate from
life. This conception of discrete professional roles
exist[s] not only in the minds of professionals and laypersons in the community,
but [is] also effectively institutionalized in the structure and codes of the professions
and the process of professional education. They include, but go far beyond, a
systematic set of positive norms of professional conduct, for a professional role
also defines an identity for its occupant. A role requires certain personal qualities
and these personal qualities, Goffman notes, if "effectively imputed and effectively
claimed, combine with a position's title ... to provide a basis of self-image for
the incumbent" as well as a basis for the image others have of him or her.44
For reasons that are not entirely clear, analysis and criticism of
professional ethics generally do not distinguish between these two levels
of justification. The assumption that professional ethics must be different
from those of the community may be so ingrained that it is difficult
to challenge at all. Perhaps both levels of justification can validly account
for some degree of deviation of professional from community ethics.
40 This argument is raised, then criticized, in ibid
Other articles on collective responsibility of professionals working as a group or as employees
in ethically questionable situations include, P. French, ed., Individual and Collective Responsibility
(1972); R. Downie, "Collective Responsibility" (1969) 44 Philosophy 66.
41 See Pg., Churchill, supra, note 1; Agich, supra, note 25.
42 "The interposition of special norms is to simplify the moral universe and to shift decisions
toward consequences that are cumulatively best, but unlikely to be achieved by individual well-
intentioned agents acting on their own." Goldman, supra, note 5 at 23. Rich, supra, note 30 at
781; Wasserstrom, supra, note 20 at 2, 8-9; Wasserstrom, supra, note 31 at 29-30; Emmet, supra,
note 3; Bowie, supra, note 3 at 59 (physicians).
Notice this is diametrically opposed to the justification of a different professional ethic at
the level of the ideal. At that level, the ethical universe of the professional was understood to
be more complicated than that of the ordinary person. See pages 2 to 4, supra.
43 Wasserstrom, supra, note 20 at 2-5.
44 G. Postema, "Self-Image, Integrity and Professional Responsibility" in supra, note 2 at 287.
The consequences to the individual's well-being of a role morality which is different from personal
moraltiy have been the subject of numerous books and articles and will be discussed in Part III,
infra.
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It may be difficult to envision as a matter of theory the social and personal
consequences of the adoption of one level of justification over the other.
The gap between abstract principles and practical applications is
often bridged by literature through which ". . . we get to experience the
human drama and ... [get] a more complete look at the way people
are, with all their ambiguities and contradictions." 45 Part II of this article
discusses a play by Tom Stoppard in which the personal and social
implications of professional ethics that deviate from community norms
are probed. The characters in the play are confronted with ethical
dilemmas which force them to examine the validity and limitations of
the role and ideal justifications upon which their system of ethics are
founded. Part III considers the implications of Stoppard's message for
the ethics of the legal profession.
II. TOM STOPPARD'S PROFESSIONAL FOUL
"A conception of a professional role, then, is less like an idealized
code of law and more like a sketch of a dramatic part."46 British playwright
Tom Stoppard is sometimes included among dramatists of the Theatre
of the Absurd.47 Yet in his later plays, including Professional Foul,48 he
moves away from the sense of futility characteristic of the absurd as
"he extends the limits of absurdity by dramatizing the outside world
concretely, as a part of a recognizable social system.... [H]e creates
characters who are not resigned to absurdity but are determined to battle
against such a vision of the world.... ."49 So while his characters may
find themselves in an absurd universe - one that is unpredictable, amoral,
indifferent to the existence of man - they "are struggling, not surrend-
ering. They are aware of the absurdity, yet they are unwilling to resign
themselves to it."50
The setting of Professional Foul is Prague, Czechoslovakia in 1977,
where two international events, a philosophical consortium and a World
Cup qualifying soccer match between England and Czechoslovakia, are
45 W. Domnarsk, "Law-Literature Criticism: Charting a Desirable Course with Billy Budd"
(1984) 34 J. Leg. Ed. 702 at 703.
46 Postema, supra, note 44.
47 See generally, M. Esslin, The Theater of the Absurd, rev'd ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1968); J. Killinger, World in Collapse: The Vision of Absurd Drama (New York: Dell, 1971).
48 T. Stoppard, Every Good Boy Deserves Favor and Professional Foul (New York: Grove Press,
1978).
49 V. Cahn, Beyond Absurdity: The Plays of Tom Stoppard (Rutherford, NJ.: Fairleigh Dickinson
University Press, 1979) at 153.
50 Ibid. at 153.
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being held. In the course of these events two of Stoppard's characters,
Broadbent, a professional soccer player, and Anderson, a philosophy
professor, are confronted with ethical dilemmas that challenge the
justifications of the ethical principles upon which their professional lives
are built.
In Professional Foul, Broadbent plays centre position for the English
soccer team. During the World Cup match, just as a Czech team member
is about to score yet another goal, Broadbent is confronted with an ethical
dilemma. He can abide by the written rules of the game, in which case
he will be incapable of preventing the Czech player from scoring the
certain goal, or he can break the written rules, that is, act unethically,
by deliberately tackling his opponent from behind, thereby risking serious
physical injury to the Czech player. The advantages to be gained by
breaking the rules are significant. If the tackle is not noticed by the
referee, Broadbent will have saved a certain goal. Should the opposing
player be injured, then one of the most skilled of the opposing team
will be unable to play. On the other hand, the disadvantage to breaking
the rules is merely that, should Broadbent be caught, a penalty kick
will be assessed; and a penalty kick might be blocked. Broadbent resolves
his dilemma by tackling his opponent from behind. He commits a
professional foul.
Broadbent's tackle is a 'foul' because it is carried out in a manner
that is in violation of the written rules of the game. Significantly, however,
his tackle is termed a "necessary foul,"51 a "deliberate foul,"52 a "pro-
fessional foul."53 This language infers that although Broadbent's conduct
is a violation of the written rules of the game, it is not totally unanticipated.
To the contrary, "necessary" and "professional" fouls are by inference
a required part of the game,5 4 especially when such fouls advance the
purpose of the game (to demonstrate superior skill by achieving a higher
score). Thus, although the written rules might prohibit such conduct,
the alternative of rule-breaking conduct not only exists, it is defined by
special game language and is anticipated by the existence of a prede-
termined sanction, a game penalty.
Broadbent's unethical conduct was not only anticipated, it was
implicitly required by the unwritten rules of the game. A reporter who
comments upon Broadbent's tackle remarks: "there was nothing to prevent
51 Supra, note 48 at 85.
52 Ibid at 106.
53 Ibid at 85.
54 "The deliberate foul is called professional because it is justified by its purpose - a victory
for the team and honour to England." L. Gabbard, The StoppardPlays (Troy, N.Y.: Whitson Publishing,
1982) at 140.
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Deml scoring except what Broadbent took it on himself to do, which
was to scythe Deml down from behind."55 The reporter's tone suggests
that Broadbent was required to choose to break the rules, that he had
really no option except to tackle Deml, and that his choice, once made,
had the mark of a professional obligation.56
One should distinguish game-anticipated unethical conduct which
is being called a 'professional foul' from unethical conduct not anticipated
by the game. Given that the objective of a soccer game is to score more
points than the opponent, Broadbent could also have pursued that objective
by taking out a gun and shooting the Czech player. This unethical conduct
is unanticipated. No penalty exists for it. It is not a recognized form
of non-compliance with the rules of the game. Indeed, the rules of the
game do not deal with use of guns at all. Community penalties rather
than game penalties would apply to Broadbent's action and he would
face the consequences of his unethical conduct not in the game but in
society.57 If Broadbent had taken out a gun and shot the Czech player,
he would have been acting outside the approved deviation of the role
of a soccer player. Since he would also have been acting outside the
permitted actions of a citizen, he would have to bear the predetermined
community penalty.
Since "[a] game, after all, is only a model of reality," 58 it is ordinarily
understood to create a closed universe of experience. A player of a game
ordinarily is capable of distinguishing between the ethics of his role as
a player (which are defined by the rules of game conduct) and the ethics
of his personal life (which are defined by community norms). A player
is expected to distinguish such role-justified conduct as the tackle of
another player (even an 'illegal' tackle) and conduct appropriate to
everyday life. (Tackling people who are walking along the street is not
part of the role.)
Mc Kendrick, a young philosophy professor who is in Prague for
the philosophical consortium, is morally outraged by Broadbent's tackle.
Mc Kendrick objects that Broadbent fails to recognize that violating the
55 Supra, note 48 at 92 (emphasis added).
56 See E. Cobley, "Catastrophe Theory in Tom Stoppard's Professional Foul" (1984) 25 Cont.
Lit. 53 at 62.
57 The line between a professional foul - one expected by the rules and permitted in the
course of the game - and conduct which carries with it civil liability is at times a fine one.
In Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals Inc. (1979), 601 F. 2d 516 (10th Cir.), defendant football player
was held civilly liable for an intentional blow struck after plaintiff opposing player had blocked
him. The court reasoned: "The intentional striking of a player in the face or from the rear is
prohibited by the playing rules as well as the general customs of the game.... Undoubtedly these
restraints are intended to establish reasonable boundaries so that one football player cannot inflict
a serious injury on another." (at 521).
58 M. Davis, Game Theory (New York: Basic Books, 1970) at vii.
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rules of the game is unethical conduct that intrudes or spills over into
ordinary life, negatively affecting both the personal ethics of the player
and the ethics of the community as a whole.
MC KENDRICK: How can you expect the kids to be little gentlemen when their
heroes behave like yobs - answer me that ... if you've got yobs on the field
you're going to have yobs on the terraces....
Roy [Broadbent] is sensitive because he gave away a penalty today, by a
deliberate foul. To stop a certain goal he hacked a chap down. After all, a penalty
might be saved and broken legs are quite rare - It's perfectly all right - you
were adopting the utilitarian values of the community, for the good of the team,
for England! But I'm not talking about particular acts of expediency. No, I'm
talking about the whole ethos.59
Mc Kendrick's point is that the notion of a professional foul is a dangerous
one, contaminating the privileged ethos of the game and undercutting
the moral foundations of those who are not subject to the game's gentle
sanction of a game penalty. Mc Kendrick believes that persons of public
stature (even professional game players) have an obligation to exhibit
the highest standards of conduct. These standards are corrupted by the
notion of a professional foul.
Yet Broadbent (contrary to Mc Kendrick's charge) is uncomfortable
with the notion of a professional foul. When, a few days before the
game, it is brazenly suggested to him that such a professional foul might
become appropriate, he cuts short the conversation lest it be overheard.60
And, goaded by Mc Kendrick's tirade, Broadbent threatens and finally
strikes the young philosopher.61 Although the other characters believe
Mc Kendrick takes too seriously the consequences to ordinary life
of Broadbent's game conduct, the latter apparently - perhaps instinc-
tively - realizes that unethical game conduct spills over into a player's
personal life.62 In point of fact, Broadbent's violent reaction to Mc Kendrick
reveals such a spill.
The central character in Professional Foul is Anderson, an Oxford
professor of philosophy who has been invited to deliver a paper entitled
"Ethical Fictions as Ethical Foundations" to the philosophy consortium.
In the course of the play, Anderson's professional ethics are challenged
by his observation of the violation of human rights by a totalitarian State.
At the opening of the play, Anderson is revealed to be completely
out of touch with any part of the field of philosophy except that of
59 Supra, note 48 at 105-6.
60 Ibid at 68.
61 Ibid at 109.
62 See R. Buhr "The Philosophy Game in Tom Stoppard's Professional Four, (1981) 22 Midwest
Q. 407 at 412; Gabbard, supra, note 54 at 143-44.
19861
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
his own narrow theoretical interests, admitting: "I'm afraid as I explained
I'm not very good at keeping up with the philosophical." 63 He is vague
and fastidious, at once embarrassed and threatened by physical phenomena
which are so foreign to Anderson as to be unnatural: "Have you noticed
the way the wings [of the airplane] keep wagging? ... Solid steel. Thick
as a bank safe. Flexing like tree branches. It's not natural."6 4 He is a
stereotypical academic: dropping names, playing elitist one-upsmanship
games, and denigrating all those who do not share his precise scholarly
niche.
Anderson delights in the manipulation of language. Yet he is not
confident that the medium of language, upon which he relies to convey
his thoughts and scholarship, is suitable for the task of communication.
He describes linguistic analysis as "[a] lot of chaps pointing out that
we don't always mean what we say, even when we manage to say what
we mean. Personally, I'm quite prepared to believe it."65 In fact, Anderson
is careless with language, presuming on one hand that the arrangement
of words has no effect on their meaning; asserting, on the other, that
the moral quality of an act can be improved by changing its descriptive
label. Anderson recharacterizes Mc Kendrick's field of academic interest,
which Mc Kendrick describes as the philosophical assumptions of social
science, as the science of social philosophy. He politely attempts to
diminish the gravity of the human rights violations in Czechoslovakia
by casting the facts in the most conciliatory of terms, while admonishing
Mc Kendrick for refusing to confront the truth:
ANDERSON: There are some rather dubious things happening in Czechoslovakia.
Ethically.
MC KENDRICK: Oh yes. No doubt.
ANDERSON: We must not try to pretend otherwise.
MC KENDRICK: Oh quite. I mean I don't. My work is pretty political. I mean by
implication, of course. As yours is .... 66
Anderson's facility with.language and his isolation from the world
outside academia have provided him a means by which and an envi-
ronment in which ethical conduct has become estranged from ethical
ideals. Anderson recognizes individual rights and self-determination as
valid ethical ideals. These ideals he labels 'fictional' because they are
abstract and incapable of scientific proof. The problem is that Anderson's
code of ethical conduct, which perhaps was originally intended to achieve
63 Supra, note 48 at 51.
64 Ibid at 45 (emphasis in original).
65 Ibid at 45.
66 Ibid at 47-48.
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such ethical ideals, has deteriorated into rules of social etiquette or
customary manners. He has then elevated conformity with rules of
etiquette to have ethical value in itself. Anderson believes that if everyone
acts in a polite manner, moral order will be achieved and maintained.
He no longer probes the reality behind appearances of good manners.
Conforming behaviour has become an end in itself; it is morality.
Anderson relegates duty and correct behaviour to the status of good manners,
club rules and etiquette, yet he raises all of these normative rule systems to an
ethical dimension when he explains that "the history of human calumny is largely
a series of breaches of good manners." For Anderson the 'moral ought' becomes
a pragmatic rule that is recognized as a fiction but treated as if it were an absolute
truth.67
Repression of individual expression by the State is the backdrop
against which Anderson's ethical dilemma arises. On the night he arrives
in Prague, Anderson is confronted at his hotel by Hollar, his former
philosophy student. Although Hollar took a first in philosophy when he
studied in England, he is now employed by the State to clean the lavatories
at the bus station. At great peril to himself, Holiar has written a manuscript
critical of the State's repression of individual rights. He asks Anderson
to smuggle the manuscript out of the country so it can be published.
Anderson's code of manners requires him to refuse to assist Hollar.
ANDERSON: ... Now, you know, really, I'm a guest of the government here.
HOLLAR: They would not search you.
ANDERSON: That's not the point. I'm sorry ... I mean it would be bad manners,
wouldn't it?
HOLLAR: Bad manners?
ANDERSON: I know it sounds rather lame. But ethics and manners are interestingly
related. The history of human calumny is largely a series of breaches of good
manners .... Perhaps if I said "correct behaviour" it wouldn't sound so
ridiculous .... 68
Since Anderson is in Prague as a guest of the State, to criticise the State
in any way, to take advantage of the privileges he is afforded as a guest,
is impolite, hence unethical.
By manipulating language Anderson attempts to modify the reality
Hollar reveals. Anderson substitutes the phrase "correct behaviour" for
"bad manners" in an effort to ignore the growing recognition that his
code of manners may be out of touch with the reality of the state's
violations of individual rights. Although the technique works in the realm
67 R. Buhr, "Epistemology and Ethics in Tom Stoppard's Professional Four' (1980) 13 Comp.
Drama 320 at 324.
68 Supra, note 48 at 60.
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of academic intellectual speculation, in ordinary life the real character
of a thing is not changed by the words used to describe it.
Hollar explains his thesis to Anderson, expecting its natural fun-
damental truth to persuade Anderson to agree to smuggle the manuscript
out of the country.
HOLLAR: ... The ethics of the State must be judged against the fundamental ethic
of the individual. The human being, not the citizen. I conclude there is an obligation,
a human responsibility, to fight against the State correctness. Unfortunately that
is not a safe conclusion.69
The reliability of language here fails Anderson again for while Hollar
is expressing concern for his physical safety, Anderson presumes Hollar's
term "safe" means that the conclusion of his thesis is not analytically
sound. Anderson thereupon launches a hypothetical argument as if all
that is happening between him and Hollar is casual speculation upon
various theoretical alternatives.
By refusing to recognize the facts of human suffering presented by
Hollar, Anderson keeps intact his code of manners, even building into
the code little shelters of 'law' as the ultimate symbols of civilized
manners.70
Hollar maintains that the relationship between the individual and the State should
be governed by natural or inherent rights so that the individual must be protected
against the collective. In contrast, Anderson believes that the individual and the
State freely enter into a reciprocal contract. According to this reasoning, Anderson
is morally bound to obey the laws of Czechoslovakia, for he has entered the country
of his own free will. However, Hollar is justified in fighting against the State
because he was not free to accept or reject its laws. Anderson rationalizes that
opposition to the state would be morally wrong for him but right for Hollar.7 1
Anderson's refusal to smuggle the manuscript is based in part on notions
of contract as if the political world in which he finds himself is constrained
by notions of consent and self-determination.
ANDERSON: Perhaps the correct thing for me to have done is not to have accepted
their invitation to speak here. But I did accept it. It is a contract, as it were,
freely entered into. And having accepted their hospitality I cannot in all conscience
start smuggling.., you know.., it's just not ethical.
HOLLAR: But if you didn't know you were smuggling it -
ANDERSON: Smuggling entails knowledge.
HOLLAR: If I hid my thesis in your luggage, for instance.
69 Ibid at 61.
70 Justification of a professional ethic which differs from a community norm sometimes proceeds
on a contract theory. See eg. Bowie, supra, note 3 at 60; Dubik, supra, note 8 at 52-53; Veatch,
supra, note 3 at 1; Wasserstrom, supra, note 31 at 31, 33; Goldman, supra, note 5 at 6.
71 Cobley, supra, note 56 at 59.
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ANDERSON: That's childish. Also, you could be getting me into trouble, and your
quarrel is not with me. Your action would be unethical on your own terms -
one man's dealings with another man. I am sorry.72
Anderson's ethics obscure reality with rhetoric and verbal felicity.
He "overlook[s] the more complex elements of human nature and
suffering.... [He] construct[s] and adopt[s] fictions and systems which
allow [him] to order [his] life; but to maintain these fictions or systems,
[he is] forced to sacrifice other individuals." 73 Anderson refuses Hollar's
plea to smuggle the manuscript out of the country. But because Hollar
convinces him he will be searched when he leaves Anderson's hotel,
Anderson agrees to keep the manuscript and drop it off at Hollar's
apartment the next day.74
When Anderson arrives at the apartment he finds that, the night
before, Hollar was not merely searched but also was arrested and that
Hollar's wife and son have endured a police search of their home for
the ensuing twenty hours. Anderson too is detained and questioned by
state police.75 While Anderson is at Hollar's apartment the police pretend
to find American dollars hidden beneath the floor boards. This discovery
will enable the police to charge Hollar with the crime of black market
currency trafficking rather than with political dissidence.76
The reality of the violation of the individual rights by the authoritarian
State imposes itself upon Anderson first hand, yet at this point, he still
72 Supra, note 48 at 62-63.
73 Supra, note 67 at 326.
74 Hollar is a target of police investigation because of his dissident political views and because
he signed Charter 77. Charter 77 was a manifesto drafted by a Czech human rights organization
which proclaimed "that the Czechs had been deprived freedom of speech and worship and the
rights to privacy and due process that had been guaranteed by the International Covenants on
Human Rights confirmed in Helsinki in 1975." F. Londrd, Tom Stoppard (New York: F. Ungar,
1981) at 144.
In fact, Czech playwright Vaclav Havel, on whom the character Hollar is said to be based,
signed Charter 77 and was imprisoned for four months. Stoppard had later visited Havel in
Czechoslovakia after he was released. Two years afterwards Havel was sentenced to prison for
four and a half years "on charges of slander and subversion against the state." Ibid. 145-46. See
also Gabbard, supra, note 54 at 136.
75 Anderson charges that the treatment he is receiving by the police is bad manners: "I am
a guest of the Czechoslovakian government. I might almost say an honored guest." Supra, note
48 at 83.
Anderson was on his way to the soccer match in which Broadbent was to commit his professional
foul. That he left the philosophical consortium to attend the match suggests Anderson's code of
manners is not as rigid as he tells Hollar it is. Gabbard analyzes this element of Anderson's character
development in ibid at 142-44.
76 In effect, the police have committed a professional foul: "[Hollar] appears, thereby, to be
a criminal rather than a dissident. This deliberate violation of the Czech constitution, which guarantees
its citizens freedom of expression, protects the government from the embarrassing truths in Hollar's
manuscript. In the eyes of the police, this is a professional foul." Ibid at 140.
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refuses to recognize that conformity to his code of manners is contrary
to the ideal of the preservation of individual rights which underlies them.77
Later that evening, Hollar's wife and son find Anderson at his hotel.
It is when Anderson is informed by Hollar's politely deferential son that
Hollar will remain imprisoned on false currency charges in retaliation
for his suspected speech violations, (and that Anderson himself is possibly
in danger), that he is squarely faced with an ethical dilemma which
"forces Anderson to deny either his moral principles [of conduct] or
his humanitarian interests." 78 Anderson must decide whether to commit
a professional foul by acting outside the code of conduct that has always
governed his professional and personal life but that now halts the
advancement of ideals to which he is committed.
Anderson decides to take actions that are contrary to his rules of
conduct but that are responsive to the ideal of individual freedom. First
he changes the content of the paper which he reads to the philosophical
consortium. 79 Distinguishing now between individual rights and com-
munity rules, Anderson defines the former as primary, inherent, and na-
tural, the latter as "a secondary and consequential elaboration of primary
rights."80 He characterizes ethical systems generally as artificial structures
that must yield to the fundamental ideals or natural truths which must
override mere codes of conduct.
Anderson commits a second professional foul by deciding to smuggle
Hollar's thesis out of the country. The difficulty is that, while upon his
77 The police repeatedly trick Anderson into betraying damaging information about Hollar's
political activities. These underhanded police methods finally compel Anderson to lie to
his investigators, a breach of "good manners" he had earlier condemned. Anderson also
cheats the police by handing over two innocent colloquium papers instead of Hollar's thesis.
Although these actions represent a change in behaviour, Anderson does not yet demonstrate
a fundamental change in philosophical attitude. His opposition to the State is justified because
the State does not live up to its side of the contract. Anderson thus reacts to a breach
in a collective rights agreement; he is still not converted to Hollar's argument for inherent
individual rights.
Supra, note 56 at 60.
78 Ibid at 59.
79 This is a professional foul. At the start of the play, Anderson's ethics are role-justified.
In his role of visiting philosopher he has an ethical obligation to fail to recognize - and certainly
to refuse to criticise - what are obvious and demonstrated human rights violations by the state.
He after all did travel to Czechoslovakia voluntarily, and is after all only a guest. It is impolite
to mention one's host's bad habits and certainly peace is most likely to be maintained if one keeps
silent. Conformity with the required code of ethics therefore has a peace-keeping quality and is
safer and easier to booL That Anderson criticizes his host in a public forum and through a medium
that the State has not consented to is clearly a violation of the rules of Anderson's code of manners.
It is, however, consistent with Anderson's ethical ideals.
80 Supra, note 48 at 111-12.
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arrival in Prague Anderson was safe and unlikely to be searched by
customs police,81 his subsequent contact with Hollar and Hollar's family
and his reading of his modified paper to the consortium have brought
him to the attention of the State. Now he will surely be searched. Anderson
must therefore find someone else to take the manuscript out of the country.
In the opening scene of the play, Anderson had met Mc Kendrick,
a younger philosophy professor, on the plane to Prague. Anderson, the
senior and well-known professor, tells Mc Kendrick he is going to do
something "a tiny bit naughty ... [u]nethical."82 Mc Kendrick presumes
Anderson means he intends to engage in subversive political activity
though Anderson is merely referring to his intention of leaving the
consortium and going to the World Cup soccer match. Mc Kendrick,
who fancies himself as fashionably to the left of the political spectrum,
tries to get Anderson to tell him what the subversive activity will be.
Anderson replies, "I don't think I'm going to tell you. You see, if I tell
you, I make you a co-conspirator whether or not you wished to be one.
Ethically I should give you the opportunity of choosing to be one or
not."8 3
In the course of the play, Mc Kendrick reveals himself to be somewhat
of a bumbler. Although he clearly presents no political threat to the
State and is unlikely to be searched when he leaves Prague, he cannot
be trusted to be discrete with knowledge of Hollar's thesis. Anderson
hides Hollar's manuscript in the luggage of the unsuspecting Mc Kendrick,
thereby exposing Mc Kendrick to genuine danger. Anderson reasons that
this action is warranted by the importance of the ideal involved,
notwithstanding that it makes Mc Kendrick a co-conspirator without his
consent and that it is, therefore, unethical.
Mc Kendrick is furious when (safely past the customs officials) he
discovers how Anderson has used him. He accuses Anderson: "It's not
quite playing the game is it?"84 But this is the point, of course: Anderson's
ethics have evolved beyond a sense that games or roles or codes of
manners are binding when they fail to achieve the ideals upon which
they are (or should be) founded.
Anderson's decision to smuggle the manuscript of Hollar's thesis
out of the country is clearly approved by Stoppard. But the method by
81 Ibid at 60.
82 Ibid at 48.
83 Ibid
84 Ibid at 124.
1986]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
which he has accomplished the decision without Mc Kendrick's consent
is ethically troublesome. "[Tihe question of consent places Anderson into
an uncomfortable ambiguous light. If moral interests permit us to scorn
the need for consent, the logical conclusion of political behaviour based
on such interests would be anarchy."85 Yet surely anarchy is as destructive
to the rights of the individual as is totalitarianism.
The ethical ambiguity of Anderson's actions is a typical quality of
the professional foul. To pursue a higher ideal by abandoning mere rules
of conduct (when the latter fail to achieve that ideal purpose) is ethically
good, yet to violate another person's individual rights in pursuit of the
goal is ethically bad.8 6 Rules of conduct are specifically developed to
prevent this kind of injury.
Notwithstanding that Stoppard's stand on the ethical quality of
conduct is "perversely ambiguous,"87 he clearly does not believe ethics
to be entirely relative. In fact, in Stoppard's universe although "everything
is relative yet ... moral absolutes exist."88 Stoppard's objective in creating
Broadbent's and Anderson's dilemmas is to explore the ethical complex-
ities of the professional foul.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ETHICS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
When one starts thinking about role-justified conduct, one naturally
starts thinking about games. Discussion of ethical standards which are
justified by rules of a professional role is facilitated by use of a game
metaphor. The comparison of the law to a game, for example, is not
uncommon, particularly when the adversary system and the lawyer's role-
85 Some commentators imply that Mc Kendrick's obnoxious character makes Anderson's action
ethically unobjectionable. See supra, note 54 at 143-44; Londr6, supra, note 74 at 150-51; T.
Whitaker, Tom Stoppard (New York: Grover Press, 1983) at 144-45.
86 One commentator suggests:
The difference between a foul and a necessary action is in the point of view. To the home
team the foul is a praiseworthy expediency; to the opponent it is a punishable offense -
a semantic difference .... Anderson offers the solution in a spontaneous remark, "the important
truths are simple and monolithic. The essentials of a given situation speak for themselves,
and language is as capable of obscuring the truth as of revealing it." His words state the
play's overruling theme.
Supra, note 54 at 144-45.
87 Supra, note 56.
88 K. Tynan, "Withdrawing with Style from the Chaos" (19 December 1977) 53 New Yorker
41 at 46.
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justified ethics within the adversary system are the subject of discussion.8 9
As in other games, competition in the law game is guided by special
rules. Like players of other games, players of the law game assume various
legal roles which allow them to behave in ways that would be considered
unethical in ordinary life. Legal proceedings (especially those that take
place within the formal adversary system) are considered to be circum-
scribed or specially bounded off from ordinary life. The rules of the
legal game are intended to control the 'test of skill' in a lawsuit so that
each participant has fair opportunity to 'perform' or present his or her
side of the case without the competition exploding into violence. Legal
contests are refereed by judges who are expected to be impartial and
uninvolved with the actual course of 'play'. Law has a special jargon.
Individual lawyers acquire superstar status and are perceived to be
available to play for the 'team' or side which can offer the best
compensation. There is even a uniform for lawyers and judges which,
while not always mandatory, is at least universally recognized as
appropriate.
However, use of the game metaphor to illuminate a role-justified
system of ethics can obscure the real ethical issues. Games are different
from law in significant ways. The purpose of games is commonly
understood by the community to be a test of skill, whether that purpose
is taken seriously (as by competitors or professional players) or lightly
(as by players just for fun).
The rules of appropriate game conduct are related to the purpose
of the game. Even when the rules are broken, they are broken in order
to achieve the purpose of the game. In this way professional fouls in
games can be anticipated: game players who break the rules will do
so in order to secure an advantage in the measurement of skill tested
by the game.
Players who participate in games do so voluntarily. Only those who
agree to be players are subject to being tackled. All the players of a
game share an understanding of the purpose and rules (written and
unwritten) of the game. Even a tackle that is carried out in a manner
that is in violation of the rules is not unexpected in a soccer match.
The decision of a player to participate in a game has consequences only
to him- or herself and other players. By deciding to play soccer one
89 Supra, note 38 at 14; M. Detmold, The Unity of Law and Morality, A Refutation of Legal
Positivism (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) at 147-61.
The function of lawyers as advocates is frequently described in terms of some limited, artificial
role governed by special rules. See Elkins, supra, note 15; C. Fried, "The Lawyer as Friend: The
Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation" (1976) 95 Yale LJ. 1060; G. Bellow & B. Moulton,
"Reflections on a Clinical Experience" in G. Bellow & B. Moulton, eds., The Lawyering Proces"
Materials for Clinical Instruction in Advocacy (1978) at 2-8.
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does not thereby also subject one's spouse and children to the possibility
of being tackled.
Games are artificially bound by time and space.90 Both players and
observers are clear about when the rules of the game apply and when
community norms of conduct apply. The privilege to knock a person
to the ground is limited to the playing field and to time-in play.
On the other hand, the purpose of the law game is much more
difficult to identify. It may be to maintain order, to achieve justice, to
provide each individual the maximum amount of freedom without limiting
the freedom of another. It may be all three of these or there may be
other purposes. The absence of a commonly understood purpose of the
law game has, as a consequence, rules governing the players that are
confusing or even contradictory.9'
Role-justified conduct focuses on conformity of behaviour and
involves the elevation of rules of conduct to ethical norms. So those
who play the law game in the role of lawyer commit themselves to
acting in conformity with the rules of the game - The Code of Professional
Responsibility. Yet those who are determined to play their roles strictly
by the rules, may find it impossible to do so without breaking the rules,
for the Code is internally inconsistent.92 The inconsistencies perhaps exist
because the Code is intended to provide the means by which a variety
of purposes are to be achieved.
It is clear that professional fouls are anticipated by the rules of
the lawyer role. Categories of unethical conduct have been named and
penalties have been determined. The participants in the legal profession
(and not the society) are responsible for evaluating the misconduct and
for imposing the penalty. The penalty is often disproportionately lenient
in comparison to the advantage the lawyer perceives would be gained
by unethical conduct. However, unlike in games, the lack of clarity of
purpose and internal coherence of the Code makes the lawyer's pro-
90 The set of rules [of a game] ... tells us what [conduct] should not be given relevance
[and] also tells us what we are to treat as real. There can be an event only because
a game is in progress, generating the possibility of an array of game-meaningful
happenings.... In addition to these game-meaningful events, we find game-generated
roles or identities ...
A matrix of possible events and a cast of roles through whose attachment the events
occur constitute together a field for fateful dramatic action, a plane of being, an engine
of meaning, a world in itself, different from all other worlds except the ones generated
when the same game is played at other times....
Games, then, are world-building activities.
Goffman, supra, note 26 at 26-27.
91 Compare, for example, Model Code of Professional Responsibility, supra, note 11, DR 1-
102(A)(5), DR 4-101(B), and DR 7-101(A)(1).
92 See generally ibid, Canons 4 and 6.
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fessional foul unpredictable. Other role players in the law game cannot
anticipate for what purpose a written rule might be broken and cannot
predict when another lawyer will feel it necessary to abandon the written
rules.
Not all those who become involved in the law game are volunteers,
as are the players of real games. Often those who are not actual law-
game players are most profoundly affected by the contradictory and
deviant code of ethical conduct and by the professional fouls of lawyers.
The undermining of public confidence in politics and the legal profession
as a whole which resulted from the unethical conduct of Watergate lawyers
has been documented.93
Predicting the relative consequences of a lawyer's unethical behaviour
in the context of a professional foul is impossible, for such conduct is
far more intrusive into life than is the unethical behaviour of a soccer
player. While Broadbent's unethical conduct has subtle implications about
the obligations of athletes as folk heroes, the person most immediately
threatened is the opposing player to whom Broadbent could have caused
serious injury. A lawyer who rejects the rules of the profession will cause
injury to his client or to his adversary's client; that is, to individuals
who often are not voluntary participants in the legal system (the game)
and who are not parties to the ethical Code (the rules) that has allowed
them to be "hacked down from behind." Because the legal institution
controls the penalties for any professional fouls about which 'non-players'
complain, either by malpractice suits or by disciplinary actions, such
'non-players' have little recourse except within the legal system that has
allowed them to be injured.
Furthermore, the distinction between role morality and personal
morality is far less easy for lawyers to maintain than for game players.
There is "a sense of omnipotence that one acquires in law school [that]
is directly related to the fact that law is so pervasive in our culture.
The domain of law extends to virtually all individual and social prob-
lems." 94 Law games are not easily confined to court rooms or to behaviour
occurring during the regular work week. In fact it has been suggested
that lawyers find it difficult to act except within the ethics of the legal
role.
The legal persona.., can touch the private life of the self profoundly. Commonly,
the legal persona dominates the individual's personality.... In such a case of
psychological identification, the legal persona is internalized and becomes indis-
tinguishable at a psychological level from other disguises of the self. The effects
93 See ag., D. Harward, ed., Crisis in Confidence The Impact of Watergate (Boston: Little Brown,
1974).
94 Elkins, supra, note 23 at 16.
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of overidentification with the lawyer's role lead to rigidity and an inability to
change masks as required by society.95
As a result, the ethics of the professional role become the ethics of the
individual.9 6 Yet viewed in even the most flattering light, principles of
legal ethics and the norms of the Code of Professional Responsibility are
clearly inappropriate as models for such personal morality.
One critic suggests that Stoppard objects most to the implication that when life's
institutions are compared to games these institutions are often perceived as being
intrinsically unimportant or optional: since games are normally perceived as closed
systems of rules with little or no overlap with actual life, institutions such as law
or ethics are often viewed in the same manner when they are compared to games.
97
Comparison of law to a game trivializes it and ignores the important
differences between the two.
Thinking of law as a game, and legal ethics as its rules, is useful
insofar as the metaphor is used to demonstrate the fallacies that such
institutions are something completely different from life and that unethical
conduct within institutional roles is without consequence to those outside
them. Beyond this, the usefulness of the metaphor diminishes, and, as
Stoppard suggests, is potentially dangerous. For law is not a game, it
does not operate completely independently of the rest of society, and
yet lawyers are largely unaccountable for their professional fouls to any
but those who are also within and protected by the legal system. The
lack of a demonstrably coherent relationship between the purpose of
law or of the adversary system and the Code governing the actions of
lawyers, along with the inconsistencies in the Code itself, further warn
against a view of law as a neat, closed universe in which privileged
unethical behaviour is safely bounded.
When rules defining ethical conduct become of value in themselves
without regard to the consequences of those rules to people who do
not participate in the game, the comparison of law and lawyers to games
and players becomes inappropriate. At that point the dimensions of the
danger of relying solely on either the game metaphor or upon role-
95 Ibid at 749.
96 See Elkins, supra, note 15; Watson, supra, note 23. See also T. Willging & T. Dunn, "The
Moral Development of a Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education"(1981) 31 J. Leg.
Ed. 306; A. Katz & M. Denbeaux, "Trust, Cynicism and Machiavellianism among Entering First
Year Law Students" (1976) 53 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 397.
This is perhaps what is behind the periodic calls for education in legal ethics that emphasizes
the responsibilities of the lawyer as a member of society rather than as a player of the role of
advocate.
See e-g. Shuchman, supra, note 19; Selinger, supra, note 8; J. Noonan, "Other People's Morals:
The Lawyer's Conscience" (1981) 48 Tenn. L. Rev. 227.
97 Buhr, supra, note 62 at 409-10.
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differentiation to justify the deviation of professional legal ethics from
those of the community become clear. At this theoretical impasse,
justification of the different professional ethic on the level of the ideal
becomes useful. Yet that level of justification requires an inquiry into
the actual relationship between professional conduct and the achievement
of the ethical ideal. It is not clear that such a relationship between the
real and the ideal exists in the ethics of the legal profession.
Like Anderson, lawyers tend to lose touch with the natural world
beyond the artificial structure of the profession. The complexity and
esoteric quality of legal concepts, the growing need for specialization
within a narrow field of law, and the rules of the professional role98
combine to create an environment and means by which lawyers become
professionally and ethically isolated from ordinary life.99
Lawyers are, like Anderson, clever at manipulating language which
is the vehicle by which legal theory and legal argument are advanced.
Lawyers are trained to cast the facts of a single event in several different
(even contradictory) forms and are then taught how to argue that each
form accurately represents reality.
Yet lawyers seem to lack Anderson's suspicion about the suitability
of language for the task of communication and instead by their "utterances
show their own belief, as long as they act as lawyers or judges ... in
the power of their words."' 00 They fail to recognize that their "[1]anguage
concepts screen and structure [their] perception and allow [them] to
organize information and experiences.... [W]hat the lawyer charac-
terizes as 'out there' is not a true picture of an objective event or scene
but a personal and social assessment."1o Lawyers' ability to manipulate
98 On the engulfment of the person by the professional role, cf notes 94-96, supra, and
accompanying text.
99 In several ways the modem [legal] system has created a gap between legal norms and
actual values or interests of individuals in society. First, the mere (and necessary) formality
of the rules of evidence and procedure can drive up cost, increase delays and exclude
from the court's consideration information that all parties might otherwise consider relevant
and reliable. Second ... the rules of law themselves may be out of step with the parties'
values. Pluralism by definition suggests differences in perspective and potential conflicts
in values. This problem is aggravated by efforts to minimize judicial discretion in order
to maximize predictability and efficiency. Such developments may of necessity increase
the alienation towards the legal system in cases where freer discretion would produce more
equitable results.
Finally, legal rules are designed to be administered by lawyers. The language and
the formalities create barriers between the parties and the resolution process. The lawyers'
"professionalism" discourages either participation or a genuine sense of control over the
outcome of the dispute. The "priesthood" of lawyers reinforces this process.
Rich, supra, note 20 at 783.
On the "growing gap between the legal and moral orders of our society," see F. Agrait, "In
Search of a Role for the Legal System" [1980] B.Y.U.L. Rev. 797.
100 Supra, note 38 at 25.
101 Elkins, supra, note 15 at 742-43.
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facts and language and their failure to recognize the consequent distortion
of what is ordinarily perceived to be reality have serious consequences
for ethical decision making t02 because:
[t]he morally relevant facts may include much more than the professional is
accustomed to considering.... On the whole, a professional tends to emphasize
those aspects of a case that his own technical skills allow to surface. A willingness
to face neglected facts may be... important... in attacking a moral problem.' 03
The way lawyers use language and the customs of legal analysis encourage
the perception that what is ethically good is entirely relative, or a matter
of clever argument. 104
This perception is reinforced by the notion that the professional role
justifies a professional ethic. When the diversity of roles within the complex
institution of law is taken to justify ethical behaviour that differs from
the community norm, 05 the rules governing ethical conduct within the
professional role become prominent. In fact there is enormous pressure
on lawyers to conform to the rules of ethical conduct of the profession
set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility. One source of pressure
to conform is the mandatory character of the Code. A lawyer who violates
the rules is subject to discipline or disbarment. 0 6 A lawyer who refuses
to conform his ethical conduct to that required by the rules of the Code
will be denied the privilege to practice the profession.1o 7 The consequence
may be that only those who are willing to conform to the professional
code of behaviour will be permitted to participate in the profession.
102 Language can also be used to avoid ethical accountability. Supra, note 38 at 10-12.
103 W. May, "Professional Ethics: Setting, Terrain, and Teacher" in D. Callahan & S. Bok,
eds., Ethics Teaching in Higher Education (New York: Plenum Press, 1980) at 212-13.
104 [S]ince professional integrity is often taken to be the most important mark of personal
integrity, a very likely result is often that a successful lawyer is one who can strictly
identify with [the requirements of professionally ethical behaviour]. [T]he unwanted
consequence [is] that practical deliberation, judgment, and action within the role are
effectively cut off from ordinary beliefs, attitudes, feelings and relationships - resources
on which responsible judgment and action depend.
Postema, supra, note 2 at 78.
105 See generally, supra, note 31 at 25-26,28; M. Stacey, "Medical Ethics and Medical Practice:
A Social Science View" (1985) 11 J. Med. Ethics 14; Agich, supra, note 25 at 106; Goldman,
supra, note 5.
106 Although the Code states that it is not intended to be a standard for civil liability (Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement, supra, note 11), conformity with the
substance of the Code may insulate the lawyer from malpractice liability.
107 Anderson's option of committing a professional foul or of rejecting his ethics of manners
to achieve the goal of the preservation of human rights may not be an option available to the
lawyer. Anderson, having made his moral decision, can return to Oxford to speculate and write
about his new-found insight. Lawyers who commit professional fouls, who reject the manners of
the Code, of the adversary system, or of the law, may very well so alienate themselves from it
that (presuming they are permitted to remain in the legal fraternity) they are incapable of operating
successfully within it.
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Another source of pressure to conform is the psychological comfort of
the insulating effect of the Code: lawyers who observe the requirements
of the Code bear no professional accountability for the ethical conse-
quences of their acts. A third source of pressure to conform to the rules
of conduct of the Code is the phenomena by which the lawyer's personal
and professional morality are closely identified.108 A lawyer may know
that the rules of ethical conduct of the Code serve purposes distinct from
those of the professional ideal'0 9 "but you're so hung up on them you
want to treat them as if they were God-given absolutes .... So you end
up using a moral principle as your excuse for acting against a moral
interest."" 0
As Stoppard demonstrates through Anderson, one must beware when
inflexible rules of conduct become ethical values in themselves and allow
one to ignore ethical ideals such as those which promote the exercise
of inherent individual rights. The danger that this may occur within the
legal profession is real, for to an extent the Code is a code of manners.
When in the age of robber barons and their lawyers, the profession began to
put its ethics into codes, there appeared a distinction between etiquette and regulation
on the one hand and morals on the other. Each generation of American lawyers
since then has revised its code of ethics; and each revision says less about morals,
and what it does say about morals less precisely"Il
Furthermore, to a significant degree in legal ethics, conduct which
conforms to the written rules of the profession is equivalent to ethical
conduct. By merely conforming to the behavioural norms of the Code
one can possess the privileges and power attendant to the practice of
law. To be certain they are professionally ethical, lawyers need only
to behave in the manner directed by the Code. There is no need for
them ever to look behind the formalities of professional manners to the
consequences of maintaining them. Unless lawyers are careful, they may
108 Cf supra, notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
109 See eg. J. Kelly, "Notes on the Teaching of Ethics in Law School" (1981) 5 J. Leg.
Prof. 21.
110 Supra, note 48 at 99.
111 Shaffer, supra, note 2 at 3-4. Cf supra, note 24; P. Lewis, "The Drawbacks of Research
Ethics Committees" (1982) 8 J. Med. Ethics 61.
In an article exploring criteria for evaluating professional codes, the mere existence of a code
is viewed critically:
One's first reaction to codes of professional ethics is that they are a Good Thing - that
they cannot hurt and may improve the way important occupations are practiced. But this
assumption can be challenged .... [P]rofessions have an important and growing role in society
and their codes play a part in professionalization as well as in the subsequent performance
of professional tasks.... We need to decide whether code-mongering is a desirable practice
and, if it is, how it ought to be conducted and the content that is appropriate for the final
product.
Kultgen, supra, note 19 at 227.
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come to believe that conformity with professional ethics is the same
as ethical conduct.
Yet this is not so. The ethics of the profession frequently conflict
with those of the community at large. The legal system does not always
achieve the ethical ideal of justice for it enforces legal rights rather than
moral rights. It is not equally accessible to all citizens and all who come
within it are not treated uniformly. The adversary system fails to achieve
the ideal goal of fairness and accessibility insofar as it fails to make
equal the ability of all litigants to present their cases through equally
zealous and equally competent attorneys.?, Indeed, the adversary system
has not been tested against other possible systems of justice and found
to be the single best.
On the other hand, the legal system still has an enormous degree
of credibility and authority, notwithstanding contemporary criticism.
Important questions of social justice and individual rights are referred
to lawyers and courts for resolution. What Anderson said about the
motivating force of an ethical ideal is at least as true for lawyers as
for other people:
[N]atural justice, however illusory, does inspire many people's behaviour much
of the time....
There is a sense of right and wrong that precedes utterance. It is individually
experienced and it concerns one person's dealings with another person. 13
The concept of a professional foul is one that can be useful in
analyzing the ethical obligations of lawyers. While it is not without its
ambiguities, Stoppard's notion of a professional foul recognizes the
complexities of mixed loyalties14 and illuminates those shadowy bound-
aries between legality and community ethics. It can help emphasize the
need to realign the ethics and services of the profession with the needs
of the community.115 Certainly the concept of the professional foul can
help keep the professional code of ethical conduct from deteriorating
into a code of manners. And it provides an ethical alternative to
112 Luban, supra, note 24 at 468-70.
113 Supra, note 48 at 118.
114 "The moral dilemma [within the institutionalized context of professional practice] is not
what is my duty or obligation or which value has priority, but to whom am I loyal? Whom or
what am I advancing through this decision?" A. Dallery, "Professional Loyalties" in M. Bradie,
T. Attig & N. Rescher, eds., The Applied Turn in Contemporary Philosophy (Bowling Green, Ohio:
The Applied Philosophy Program, Bowling Green State University, 1983) at 73, 74.
115 There are identifiable social needs and there are professions serving them; but there does
not appear to be any one-to-one correspondence between profession and need. To be
sure, the ABA proclaims the legal profession "guardians of the Rule of Law", but the
thrust of the legal profession seems to be much more toward the settlement of disputes,
and it is from that need that lawyers are wont to trace their own origins.
Newton, supra, note 19 at 28.
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professionally mandated conduct when conformity with the latter can
only demonstrate or promote the failure of the ideals upon which the
ethics of the legal profession are (or should be) founded.

